Science thrives on international collaboration, but what should be done when researchers and students from countries such as China and Russia come here to steal sensitive knowledge in order to strengthen the position of their regimes?

For about six years now, knowledge security has been a hot topic in higher education, particularly at universities. Alarm bells have rung several times, for example when TU Delft unintentionally helped advance the Chinese military (as university magazine Delta revealed), and when a human rights center at VU Amsterdam turned out to be funded by China.

“We’ve been somewhat naive,” then-Minister of Education Robbert Dijkgraaf (D66) said in 2022. He announced the screening of researchers and master’s students in “sensitive” fields. The previous government developed the plan further: the screening would affect about 40 percent of researchers hired in science and engineering. On top of that, master’s students in those fields would also be screened.

The plans drew considerable criticism. “This legislative proposal creates an unmanageable number of screenings and makes the Netherlands less attractive to international talent,” said Caspar van den Berg, president of the universities’ association UNL, “while it remains uncertain whether the law will actually contribute to greater security.”

In a letter to the House of Representatives, Minister Rianne Letschert now writes that the screening will not be introduced for the time being. The question is: who exactly should be screened? Defining “sensitive” fields has proven to be extremely difficult. Moreover, a great deal is already being done to improve knowledge security, she argues in a separate letter.

Is screening proving easier said than done?

“We’re still at the drawing board. There’s a reason we asked various stakeholders for their views on the draft legislative proposal. We looked at its effectiveness, proportionality, and feasibility and had to conclude that the current proposal does not meet the requirements. A broad screening system is not feasible. I discussed this with my colleagues in the government, and everyone agreed.”

You are now working on a more limited screening system. How ‘limited’ will it be?

“It’s too early to say. I’m going to look at that together with my colleague from the Ministry of Economic Affairs. We want a level playing field: the knowledge security measures for innovative businesses should not differ drastically from those at public knowledge institutions. We need to coordinate that carefully.” (The government recently decided that there will be no knowledge security screening for the business sector, ed.)

You compliment educational institutions on the steps they have already taken.

“Awareness has increased significantly. No one needs convincing anymore about the importance of knowledge security. The research community had to get used to the idea, but it has now made major strides.”

The academic community pushed back quite strongly against the screening law. Did the prospect of screening also help raise awareness?

“I think so. The screening proposal made it clear that they really had to take the issue seriously. And the security services continue to warn about the risks.”

You are giving institutions a total of 80 million euros over the next five years for knowledge security. What will they do with that funding?

“They need to do all sorts of things, such as developing their own knowledge security frameworks, running awareness campaigns, engaging in discussions with new employees, and providing support.”

This article was translated using AI-assisted tools and reviewed by an editor.