TU/e has established guidelines (on the intranet) to comply with the National Knowledge Security Guidelines, and these are now gradually being implemented across all departments. There is an email address for questions, and several staff members are working on policies that align our scientific activities with these new developments. Last October, a Safety and Security dialogue session was held to present and discuss the current situation.

Perhaps I missed something along the way, but I am struggling with this entire process. The government is asking us to reassess all our research collaborations. Sometimes this seems fairly concrete, such as universities in Iran and Syria with which we are not allowed to collaborate due to European sanctions legislation. But there are many more countries subject to EU sanctions.

And of course, none of this is black and white. Should we avoid collaborating with China or Russia and continue working with the United States? Lists are not as self-evident as they may seem. And we should not be fooled into treating states as if they are interchangeable with their citizens. Making these judgments is far from simple, because the ground beneath our feet is shaky.

When it comes to other issues, the government is even more vague. The focus is on “threats and risks” related to knowledge sharing and research collaboration—not exactly the area of expertise of researchers working at TU/e. The concern is with so-called dual-use technologies, techniques that can be used for both beneficial and harmful purposes.

If you try to determine what exactly counts as dual-use, you quickly discover that nearly everything we do in technology fits that label—some techniques more clearly than others, but very few are excluded. This is not surprising, since technology can be applied in countless ways, and people often disagree on what is right or wrong. Finding a workable approach here is nearly impossible.

The dialogue session focused mainly on military applications. This reveals the consequences of decades of a laissez-faire attitude toward such research: those who considered it important could pursue it, and those who did not could simply refrain. There has been no substantive debate about whether military research at TU/e is desirable, or how it aligns, for example, with the Sustainable Development Goals. We lack a shared vision to guide our decisions.

These vague circumstances make it difficult for researchers at a university that depends on external partnerships, and this affects both our work and our community.

First of all, doing science means sharing knowledge. Shielding knowledge runs counter to the very essence of science. Researchers who do this compromise their own standards. We know this phenomenon from collaborations with industry, where it already creates tension with the university’s public mission. In that context, there is at least a time limit or financial compensation. Shielding knowledge from potential enemies creates only losers.

Second, activities intended to promote knowledge security undermine the core values of our TU/e community, such as diversity, inclusion, and good employer and employee practices. Uncertainty about whether research partnerships are still acceptable, or whether research may be considered too risky—because it might be too dual-use—encourages people to retreat into what seems safe.

Many researchers will be discouraged from working with full energy and enthusiasm alongside others. That is not what we want, but I have seen no indication that the university recognizes this consequence, let alone that it expresses trust in the judgment of its researchers, even when they explore uncertain territory.

And finally: these developments are affecting our international community. Imagine having ties, through birth, family, or work, with one of the countries currently being stigmatized. For now, the consequences may still be small and subtle, but history provides us with too many examples of how prejudice is fed and how it can escalate into a nightmare, based on nothing but short-sighted conformity.

The National Knowledge Security Guidelines warn against exactly this, in a single sentence: “Measures concerning knowledge security must not ‘go overboard’ and result in arbitrary exclusion, suspicion, or discrimination.” This warning has received little attention at TU/e so far.

I am holding my breath three times over. Most of all because of this last point.

Jan Vleeshouwers is a research policy officer at the Department of Electrical Engineering. The views expressed in this column are his own.

This article was translated using AI-assisted tools and reviewed by an editor.