Defense-related research
If health care, education, and businesses can benefit from scientific innovations, then so should defense, argues Christine Boshuijzen-van Burken. However, she advises researchers to keep Article 36 of the Geneva Conventions in mind.
What do Mohsen Fakhrizadeh and Damien Ernst have in common? Fakhrizadeh was an Iranian nuclear scientist who was assassinated in 2020 because his expertise directly benefited Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program. Ernst is a Belgian computer scientist who was pelted with pies during a lecture last month because his work was perceived as benefiting the defense industry.
In light of these cases, I can well understand why scientists think twice—or even three times—before entering into a partnership with a defense-related organization. Before you know it, you have a pie in your face—or worse.
Beyond security concerns, there is a deeper question to consider: what is the relationship between science and defense? Are the two inherently incompatible? I am an academic at TU/e and a reservist in the Dutch armed forces.
I am convinced that the relative freedom we enjoy in the Netherlands to conduct scientific research is due, in part, to defense. We enjoy both academic freedom in terms of the subjectof our research and a relative degree of “freedom of movement” when it comes to working with individuals or organizations that we believe can help deepen or broaden our knowledge.
Had we ended up on the other side of the Berlin Wall under communism, or remained under a totalitarian regime, we would have enjoyed neither of these freedoms. “Protecting what we hold dear” is the motto of the Dutch armed forces, and academic freedom is part of that.
The academic world therefore depends on defense, but the reverse is also true. Unless we embrace absolute pacifism (which I consider a wonderful ideal, but one that would leave me powerless in the face of profound injustice that threatens lives) a military organization has a legitimate reason to exist and therefore needs the resources to fight.
Just as educational institutions, health care providers, and businesses can use the results of scientific research in their respective fields, so can defense. Unless one believes that the military has no legitimate reason to exist, as absolute pacifism would suggest, defense should be able to provide funding for scientific research that meets its current needs, just as other fields of practice do, including medicine, business, and nongovernmental organizations. There is nothing inherently wrong with this.
A problem arises when defense starts interfering with the scientific content of research. But the same problem can occur in projects funded by businesses. Researchers working on defense-related projects, as well as the defense personnel involved, must be fully aware of the need to safeguard academic freedom. Ultimately, this benefits not only science but also the defense organization itself.
Defense-related research in which academic freedom may be subordinated to other priorities should be conducted at national research institutes, such as TNO, NLR, RIVM, and MARIN.
Finally, scientists may have concerns about how their work will be used. This group is not necessarily opposed to defense research. Its members would also welcome intervention by the armed forces if a swarm of armed drones were heading toward the High Tech Campus, and they are grateful for protection against state-sponsored cyberattacks intended to corrupt their unique scientific datasets.
To this group, I would say: I share your concerns. I would encourage you, wherever possible, to investigate exactly where your knowledge ends up, who builds on it, and how funding flows are structured. You as researchers can often make a reasonable assessment of how your knowledge might logically be applied or developed further, and which parties you would prefer to keep at a distance because you have doubts about their intentions.
Alongside this encouragement, I would also offer some reassurance: the Netherlands has signed various international conventions governing what is and is not permitted during wartime. Article 36 of the Geneva Conventions (Additional Protocol I) stipulates that countries do not have complete freedom to choose their means or methods of warfare.
Countries must comply with strict rules, and legal experts ensure that any technology defense intends to acquire is assessed against the principles of the convention before it is purchased. In practice, this means investigating whether the technology, when used as intended, allows combatants to be distinguished from noncombatants. This is why landmines are prohibited in the Netherlands.
This reassurance holds only if we trust defense to abide by these rules. It therefore cannot hurt to remind fellow applicants of Article 36 when preparing research proposals. If not for moral reasons, then perhaps for practical ones: defense cannot acquire your technology if it fails an Article 36 review.
Christine Boshuijzen-van Burken invites students interested in the relationship between technology, war, and peace to take the elective course Ethics of Technology in War and Peace (0LM200) in Q3. Among other topics, the course covers the principles of just war theory.
Boshuijzen-van Burken holds the chair in Christian Philosophy at TU/e. Her primary appointment is at the Netherlands Defence Academy, where she researches military ethics. Boshuijzen writes this opinion piece in a personal capacity.
Photo | Leoni Andriessen
This text was translated using AI-assisted tools and reviewed by an editor.

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