The Executive Board adopted a knowledge security policy in December, outlining how researchers should deal with very high-risk institutions in China. The policy also makes clear that cooperation with sanctioned institutions in Iran and Russia is prohibited under European regulations.

Departments at TU/e were allowed to decide how to communicate the policy internally. For example, staff at the Industrial Engineering & Innovation Sciences faculty received an email on April 24 from dean Gert-Jan van Houtum about the new rules. “In light of recent geopolitical developments, TU/e has introduced stricter regulations to ensure compliance with legislation and to protect our research activities,” Van Houtum wrote in the email, which Cursor has seen.

“Seven Sons”

To prevent sensitive knowledge from leaking and being used for military applications, TU/e researchers are instructed in the email to terminate any collaborations with, among others, the so-called “Seven Sons of National Defence.”

These refer to seven Chinese universities that work closely with the Chinese military. Collaborations with other universities in China, Russia, and Iran that have military ties must also be ended.

Some collaborations have already been terminated, says Vermaat. “Yes, some collaborations have been stopped. But I don’t have a complete overview of all contacts researchers have, so I don’t fully know to what extent this has happened,” he says.

Individual contacts

There are also many individual contacts between researchers in Eindhoven and colleagues in those countries, for example when they meet at international conferences. “We don’t have insight into that,” Vermaat said.

Such contacts are not necessarily a problem, according to the knowledge security manager. “We once had a question from a researcher serving on an international review panel. It included someone from a Chinese university covered by the policy. He asked for advice: can I continue participating? We allowed it.”

According to Vermaat, the Netherlands is leading in Europe when it comes to knowledge security. “We are quite restrictive as a country. Germany takes a very different approach; there, cooperation with China is still much more common.”

Screening

Vermaat and his team also screen people who come to TU/e for research purposes. “We don’t look at nationality, but at whether someone is affiliated with such a university,” he says.

“What is the sensitivity of the technology they are working on, and to what extent do they have access to sensitive knowledge? People affiliated with sanctioned universities are not allowed to be hired under any circumstances.”

National regulations

According to Vermaat, the knowledge security policy is necessary to comply with laws and regulations. “TU/e is expected to comply with various national and European laws and the national knowledge security guidelines. The Ministry of Education is really keeping a close eye.”

Those guidelines were established in 2022 and are currently being revised. The Knowledge Security Desk, where institutions can go with questions, is being strengthened, Vermaat said.

TU/e has a high-risk profile, he explained, given the technological expertise developed by its researchers. Following the guidelines is therefore crucial.

Sensitive collaborations

How does TU/e’s knowledge security policy relate to the recently announced committee on sensitive collaborations? “We both operate under General Affairs,” Vermaat said.

“The idea is that we will be integrated into the approach of the Committee on Responsible Collaborations. That will create a single point of contact where staff can go with questions about sensitive partnerships.”

Israel

Vermaat is regularly asked why the policy does not also cover collaborations with Israeli institutions. “That is a fair and understandable question,” he says.

“This policy was introduced at the government’s request. It is based on reports from intelligence and security services identifying countries actively seeking sensitive knowledge in the Netherlands.”

“Those are specifically these three countries, not Israel and not the United States. It is entirely understandable that concerns are raised about those countries, but the university is not being monitored by the government in that regard. The Committee on Responsible Collaborations, and the accompanying Moral Deliberation, will take a broader view.”

This article was translated using AI-assisted tools and reviewed by an editor